Trustee Liability For Spendthrift Trust
Assignments by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 18 | Issue 2 Article 12
Fall 9-1-1961
Trustee Liability For Spendthrift Trust Assignments
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Trustee Liability For Spendthrift Trust Assignments, 18 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 283 (1961),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol18/iss2/12
CASE COMMENTS
TRUSTEE LIABILITY FOR SPENDTHRIFT TRUST
ASSIGNMENTS
The once highly controversial issue concerning the validity of the
spendthrift trust is no longer open, except in a very few American
jurisdictions.' Support for the view favoring such trusts has been
the argument that one owning property ought to be able to dispose
of it as he sees fit, and except in a small minority of jurisdictions,2
either by statute3 or by decision, 4 a spendthrift trust has been held
valid. Moreover, this particular trust device appears to be one that
is becoming more and more regulated by statute.5 In fact many of
the jurisdictions upholding the validity of the spendthrift trust have
done so because of the validity of restraints on the alienation of
equitable interests such as those appearing in spendthrift trusts.
Delaware is one such state;6 therefore, it comes as no surprise that
in 1959 the Delaware legislature amended one of its statutes to allow
the beneficiary of a spendthrift to assign a part of his income interest
in the trust to stated organizations.7
This statute was attacked by a settlor of a valid spendthrift trust
in Wilmington Trust Co. v. Carpenter.S The trustee made an assign-
ment of income from certain securities held in a spendthrift trust to
a charitable organization at the beneficiary's request. The settlor
questioned whether the trust could be so administered, contending
that the 1959 amendatory statute was unconstitutional because it
impaired the trust contract and had the effect of taking property
without due process of law. The court upheld the validity of the
statute, stating that it was applicable to spendthrift trusts created
before, as well as those created after, the enactment of the statute.
The leading authorities9 seem to be in accord with the decision in
the Carpenter case in upholding the validity of such a statute since
neither the settlor of an inter vivos trust 0 nor the heirs or legal repre-
'Griswold, Spendthrift 'trusts § 53 (2d ed. 19-17).
2Id at § 56.
E.g., Va. Code Ann. § 55-19 (Repl. Vol. 1959).
'Nicholas v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716 (1875); Murrow v. Apple, 26 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir.
1928); Bixby v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 323 Mo. 1014, 22 SAV.2d 813 (929).
uNote 1 supra at § 6.
Del. Code Ann. tit 12, § 3536 (Supp. 1960).
'Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 3536(b) (Supp. 196o).
"163 A.2d 578 (Del. 196o).
"See Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts §§ 391, 393 (2d ed. 1947)-
"Culbertson v. Matson, ii Mo. 493 (1848); Padelford v. Real Estate-Land
Title & Trust Co., 121 Pa. Super. 193, 183 Ad. 442 (1936).
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sentatives of one creating a testamentary trust" can maintain a suit to
enforce the trust. On the other hand, a court of equity which has jur-
isdiction over the administration of trusts will give the beneficiaries
of a trust such remedies as are necessary for the protection of their
interests.' 2 Although the principal case deals with a situation in which
the settlor attempted to attack the trustee for alienating part of the
income of the spendthrift trust and it is well-settled that a settlor
does not have such a right, the more interesting problem is suggested
of a beneficiary under the same circumstances attacking the trustee.
Therefore, this comment will explore the liabilities of the trustee
that may result from a breach of trust to which the beneficiary has
either consented or requested. This can best be accomplished by care-
ful consideration and analysis of the decisions concerning assign-
ments of income and corpus under both spendthrift and non-spend-
thrift trusts.
The most logical starting point for a systematic analysis of this
area is a situation in which there is a premature termination of a
trust, spendthrift or otherwise, by the concerted action of the bene-
ficiary and the trustee. Common sense dictates that this occurs only
in rare instances; for as long as the trust endures the trustee will con-
tinue to get his commissions. Accordingly, in most -instances where
the beneficiary wants a premature termination, the trustee will raise
the cry that the settlor's intentions are of paramount importance.
However, it is possible that an over-anxious cestui may persuade the
trustee to convey the corpus of the trust property to him or to a
third party. What then will be the result?
There are two possible approaches to premature' termination,
(i) judicial and (2) extra-judicial means. The leading American de-
cision on premature termination of a trust by judicial means is Claflin
v. Claflin.13 In this case the settlor directed the trustee to pay the
residue of his personal estate to named beneficiaries. One-third was to
"Field v. Andrada, io6 Cal. 107, 39 Pac. 323 (1895); Griesel v. Jones, 123
Mo. App. 45, 99 S.W. 769 (1907); Warren v. Warren, 75 N.J. Eq. 415, 72 At. 96o
(igog); Barrette v. Dooly, 21 Utah 81, 59 Pac. 718 (1899).
"These remedies include (1) the specific enforcement of the duties of the trustee
under the trust; (2) an injunction against a threatened breach of trust; (3) re-
dress for a breach of trust; (4) the appointment of a receiver; and (5) the removal
of a trustee. See 2 Scott, Trusts § 199 (2d ed 1956); Restatement (Second), Trusts
§ 199 (1959). Normally the consent of the beneficiary to the trustees breach of
trust will constitute a bar to any remedy which he would otherwise have, but
where the trust device is of spendthrift nature this is not always true. See 2 Scott,
Trusts §§ 216, 216.1 (2d ed. 1956).
3149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (1889).
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be paid to the settlor's son in the following manner: $io,ooo when
he reached the age of twenty-one, another $io,ooo when he reached
the age of twenty-five and the remainder when the son reached the
age of thirty. The son, upon reaching his age of majority, but not yet
being twenty-five, brought suit to compel the trustee to turn over
the balance of the corpus. The court held that the restraint on antici-
pation was valid, and consequently gave effect to the settlor's obvious
intentions.
It is to be noted that in the Claflin case the restraint was on antici-
pation and not alienation. However, there would seem to be little
necessity for making the distinction because a spendthrift trust in-
volving a restraint on alienation necessarily involves a restraint on
anticipation. 14 Therefore, when the judicial termination of a spend-
thrift trust is involved, the courts seem to adopt the reasoning of the
Claflin decision; without exception, the request is denied even if all
the beneficiaries are sui juris and have consented.15
Also as noted above, premature termination may be achieved with-
out invoking the aid of judicial process. Such a result may be brought
about by the concerted action of the beneficiary and trustee. That is
to say, the trust will end when the trustee conveys his legal interest
to the beneficiary'O or when both trustee and beneficiary unite to
convey their respective interests to a third party.' 7 The approved rules
concerning extra-judicial termination have been stated as follows:
"If the legal title to the trust property and the entire bene-
"40n the other hand, every trust restraining anticipation is not a spendthrift
trust. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 2,r Del Ch. 193, 15 A.2d 665,
669 (Ch. 1940).
'E.g., Wagner v. Wagner, 244 111. 1o, 91 N.E. 66 (1910); Hay v. Le Bus. 317
Mich. 698, 27 N.W.2d 3o9 (1947); In re Heyl's Estate, 352 Pa. 407, 43 A.2d 13o
(1945); Vines v. Vines, 143 Tenn. 517, 226 S.W. 1039 (1921). Consequently, the ap-
proved rule in America in regard to judicial termination of a trust is that the
courts will prematurely terminate the trust if all the beneficiaries consent and
none are under a legal incapacity, provided that the material intentions of the
settlor are not thereby defeated. 4 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 1002 (1948);
Griswold, Spendthrift TrustO § 517 (2d ed. 1947); Restatement (Second), Trusts §
337 (1959); 3 Scott, Trusts § 337 (2d ed. 1956). The English courts reach the opposite
result in lending judicial help to the beneficiary whose property is subject to the
restraints of a trust device. In doing so, they disregard the obvious intent of the
settlor as manifested by the trust instrument. Saunders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. 115,
49 Eng. Rep. 282 (1841).
"Snell v. Payne, 25 Ky. 1836, 78 S.W. 885 (1904); Hagerty v. Clement, 195 La.
230, 196 So. 33o (1940); Partridge v. Clary, 228 Mas. 290, 117 N.E. 332 (1917).
17Dodge v. Dodge, 1o F.2d 793 (1st Cir. 1939); Lemen v. McComas, 63 Md.
153 (1885); Langley v. Conlan, 212 Mass. 135, 98 N.E. 1o64 (1912).
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ficial interest become united in one person, who is not under
an incapacity, the trust terminates."' Is
"If there is a sole beneficiary who is not under an incapacity
and the trustee transfers the trust property to him or at his
direction, or if there are several beneficiaries none of whom
is under an incapacity and the trustee transfers the trust prop-
erty to them or at their direction, the trust terminates although
the purposes of the trust have not been full accomplished."10
There appears to be little difference between a breach of trust
by the trustee and the concerted action of the trustee and beneficiary
in achieving premature termination of a trust. This leads to the
question of the trustee's liability, under both spendthrift and non-
spendthrift trusts, to the beneficiary for action in concert with him to
achieve such extra-judicial termination.
It is necessary to first examine the trustee's liability under non-
spendthrift trusts. If a beneficiary of such a trust induces the trustee
to breach his trust by an improper investment, or consents to or
ratifies the trustee's breach of trust, there is litle doubt that the bene-
ficiary cannot surcharge the trustee. Almost universally, the courts
apply the doctrine of estoppel to save the trustee harmless. 20 Further-
more, if the breach of trust questioned consists of a transfer of the
trust corpus to the beneficiary, or to a third party at the beneficiary's
direction, the eqjuitable doctrine of estoppel will be applied to a
non-spendthrift trust as illustrated by the leading Virginia case, Row-
ley v. American Trust Co. 21 An examination of the authorities dem-
onstrates that Virginia is not alone in denying relief to the acquiesc-
ing beneficiary who later objects to a conveyance to a third party or to
himself which he has either consented to or has requested.2 2 Other
decisions2 -3 demonstrate the application of this doctrine of estoppel
as a defense to a trustee in a Claftin type trust, i.e., one restraining
anticipation only.
As has been noted above, the beneficiary cannot seek judicial help
in compelling the trustee to terminate the spendthrift trust prema-
turely. The question remains, however, as to what result is reached if
the trustee does in fact convey the spendthrift trust property to the
"Such is accomplished by merger. Restatement (Second), Trusts § 341() (1959).
"Restatement, (Second) Trusts § 342 (1959).
204 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 941 (1948); Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts §
307 (ad ed. 1947).
_144 Va. 375, 132 S.E. 347 (1926).
!E.g., Shelton v. King, 229 U.S. 9 (1913); Partridge v. Clary, 228 Mass. 290,
117 N.E. .32 (1917); In re Caskey's Estate, 304 Pa. 2o8, 155 At. 489 (1931).
"E.g., Hagerty v. Clement, 195 La. 230, 196 So. 330 (1940).
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beneficiary or to another at the beneficiary's request or with his con-
sent. There is not a great deal of authority on this question, but it
would appear that the majority of courts in the United States, with
the exception of New York, a leading jurisdiction in the development
of the law of trusts, are agreed that the complaining beneficiary is
estopped from holding the trustee liable at a later date.24 Scott feels
that if this majority view is followed it will result in the beneficiary
and the trustee joining together to defeat the purpose of the settlor
in creating the spendthrift trust to protect the beneficiary against his
own improvidence.
25
In view of the Claflin doctrine it appears that some legal sanction
is necessary in order to make the trustee strictly comply with the terms
of the trust instrument. This may have been the motive of the New
York Court of Appeals, for here it is thought that the contrary re-
sult is required. Such results are based on New York statutory pro-
visions relating to trusts.26 One of these makes the interest of a life
beneficiary inalienable, while another provides that "every sale, con-
veyance or other act of the trustee, in contravention of the trust ...
shall be absolutely void." The leading case in New York is Matter
of Wentworth27 where the court pointed out that the beneficiary
cannot indirectly accomplish an alienation prohibited by statute
through estoppel, since estoppel cannot be applied to violate a statute.
Therefore, the beneficiary is not estopped to surcharge the trustee.
The decision in the Wentworth case was foreshadowed by earlier de-
cisions,28 followed in a substantial number of later decisions29 and
has been adopted in part by the Restatement of Trusts.30 However,
"Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts § 525 (2d ed. 1947), and cases cited therein.
-3 Scott, Trusts § 342.1 (2d ed. 1956).
21N.Y. Pers. Prop. Laws § 15; N.Y. Real Prop. Laws § io5.
2723o N.Y. 176, 129 N.E. 646 (1920)..
Cuthbert v. Chauvet, 136 N.Y. 326, 32 N.E. 1o88 (1893); Lent v. Howard,
89 N.Y. 169 (1882); Douglas v. Cruger, 8o N.Y. 15 (188o).
"In re Wades Will, 270 App. Div. 712, 61 N.Y.S.2d x6 (1946); Ebberts v. Inter-
national Factors, Inc., 43 N.YS.2d 522 (Sup. Ct. 1943); April v. April, 272 N.Y. 331,
6 N.E.2d 43 (1936); In re Sullard's Will, 247 App. Div. 761, 285 N.Y. Supp. 968
(1936); In re Leonard's Will, 151 Misc. 558, 271 N.Y. Supp. 897 (SunT. Ct. 1934);
Schaefer v. Fisher, 221 App. Div. 88o, 224 N.Y. Supp. 904 (1927).
-"Restatement-(Second), Trusts § 3 4 2(f) (1959). The Restatement suggests a com-
promise, for although the trustee is liable to the beneficiary, the trustee is given a
cause of action against the beneficiary. Such action, however, must be satisfied out
of proceeds other than the trust corpus which was turned over. This result appears
to be more equitable, but if the beneficiary is judgment-proof the equalizing effect
of this remedy is without avail. The harsh result reached in the Wentworth de-
cision has been somewhat modified by a later New York decision. In re Wade's Will
27o App. Div. 712, 61 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1946), aff'd 296 N.Y. 244, 72 N.E.2d 306 (1947). It
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basic objections remain to the Wentworth doctrine because it places
so large a premium on dishonesty by a beneficiary.31
The rule is clear in New York32 and elsewhere,-3 3 that if a bene-
ficiary consents to a trustee's otherwise improper investment of income
from spendthrift trust property, he may not later surcharge the trustee.
Although the beneficiary's interest in a spendthrift trust is by defini-
tion inalienable, he possesses the power to assign it.34 Originally there
was a question in New York as to whether this power extended to
income yet to accrue, as well as that already accrued.35 Decisions in
New York and in other jurisdictions cleared up this confusion by treat-
ing the beneficiary's assignment of future income as a valid but re-
vocable authority to the trustee to assign the income as it accrues.3 6
Therefore, if the trustee carries out the assignment, the beneficiary
cannot surcharge him at a later date when his authority has not
been revoked.37 In these cases the equitable doctrine of estoppel is
being applied to save the trustee harmless.38
is to be noted that this decision is still consistent with the Wentworth doctrine, for
the court refused to surcharge the trustee because of a procedural point, viz.,
that a prior decree had become final and was not subject to collateral attack. For a
similar result see O'Hagan v. Kracke, 253 App. Div. 632, 3 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1938),
where res judicata was applied. These cases illustrate that although the Wentworth
doctrine is a well-settled rule in New York, it is not always applicable.
When a spendthrift trust is created the terms of which provide that the trustee
may terminate the trust at his discretion, he, of course, incurs no liability for
making such a conveyance. To this effect see Ridgeway v. Woodward, 78 F.2d 878
(D.C. Cir. 1935); In re Fishberg's Will, 58 Misc. 3, 285 N.Y. Supp. 303 (Surr. Ct.
1936).
The most obvious objection to the Wentworth doctrine has been stated in
Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts § 526 (2d ed. 1947) as follows:
"The action of the court [allowing the beneficiary to surcharge the trustee for
the breach of trust to which he consented] in placing so great a sanction on the
duty of the trustee, seems to overlook the fact that the law does not ordinarily in-
terpret statutes so as to place so large a premium on dishonesty, here in the
beneficiary."
3E.g., In re Cavagnaro's Estate, 78 N.Y.S.2d 249 (Surr. Ct. 1947); In re Wilden-
burg's Estate, 177 Misc. 49, 29 N.Y.S.2d 896 (Surr. Ct. 1941); In re Kern's Estate,
159 Misc. 682, 288 N.Y. Supp. 655 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
3In re Miller's Estate, 333 Pa. 116, 3 A.,d 370 (1939); In re Perkins' Trust
Estate, 314 Pa. 49, 17o At. 255 (1934); See also Restatement (Second), Trusts § 216(e)
(1956).
"Restatement (Second), Trusts § 15 2(i) (1959).
nCompare In re Bechtoldt's Estate, 148 Misc. 8, 266 N.Y. Supp. 4o8 (Surr.
Ct. 1933) (valid as to accrued income, but not as to future income), with In re
Lynch's Estate, 151 Misc. 549, 272 N.Y. Supp. 79 (Surr. Ct. 1934) (valid as to both).
1In re Robbins' Will, 67 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Surr. Ct. 1946).
min re Robbins' Will, 67 N.Y.S.2d 43o (Surr. Ct. 1946); In re Keeler's Estate,
334 Pa. 225, 3 A.2d 413 (1939); Restatement (Second), Trusts § 15 2(i) (1959); Gris-
wold, Spendthrift Trusts § 306 (2d ed. 1947), and cases cited therein.
'"See Shuster's Estate, 26 Pa. Dist. 232 (1917) cited in Annot., 121 A.LR. 13o7,
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The same result is reached under a statute prohibiting the assign-
ment of the beneficiary's interest in the income of a spendthrift trust.3 9
A leading California decision 40 held an assignment valid as a contract
to assign the property when received, so that the assignee had the
usual remedies for breach of contract and could recover damages for
tle breach. This view is supported by the Restatement of Trusts.41
The above discussion relates to the trustee's liabilities which may
flow from an assignment of the corpus or income, when made with
the consent or at the request of the beneficiary. At this point it may
be asked: Wherein does the principal case fit? That case involved the
assignment at the b'eneficiary's request of income from certain se-
curities held under a spendthrift trust. Furthermore, such assignment
was made pursuant to the Delaware amendatory statute,42 and the
authority to make it had not been revoked. In terms of the trustee's
liability there was no problem concerning the assignment of this
income.4 3 A more difficult problem may be presented when such au-
thority has been revoked after the income has accrued,4 4 and the
trustee nevertheless makes the assignment. Does the statute allowing
such assignments make the beneficiary's authority irrevocable as to
income which has already accrued?
The assignment in the Carpenter case was made with the consent
of the beneficiary, and within the terms of the Delaware statutory
trust scheme. Therefore, it is submitted that the beneficiary cannot
surcharge the trustee for making the assignment of this increment
of income even though the trustee's authority has previously been
revoked. That is to say, if the court would allow the beneficiary to
revoke his authority so that he could surcharge the trustee who had
already transferred the income in reliance upon the beneficiary's
consent and the statute, the spirit of the amendatory statute would
1308 (1939), wherein the. court refused to surcharge a trustee of a testamentary
spendthrift trust for having made payments of income to the beneficiary's wife at
the request of the beneficiary. The court said:
"On very equitable and moral principle this ruling should be sustained [of
the lower court in refusing to surcharge the trustee].... After his twenty-four years
active and not passive acquiescence, the doctrine of estoppel should be invoked
if nothing else applies."
To the same effect see, In re Jones' Estate, 199 Pa. 143, 48 At. 865 (1o0).
'Clark v. Clark, 123 Kan. 646, 256 Pac. 1012 (1927); In re Valentine's Estate,
5 Misc. 479, 26 N.Y. Supp. 716 (Surr. Ct. 1893).
4OKelly v. Kelly, it Cal. 2d 356, 79 P.2d 1059 (1938).
"1 Restatement (Second), Trusts § 15 2(k) (959)-
-See note 7 supra.
13See note 37 supra.
"See note 36 supra.
